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
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State Dept. review completed

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
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
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


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LEBANON

Street fighting in Beirut slackened only slightly yesterday after yet another cease-fire—the 12th in the past seven months—was arranged.

Some of the heaviest fighting to date took place in the capital on Friday and Saturday. This was before Prime Minister Karami, who has taken over personal direction of security matters, could persuade leaders from the Phalanges Party and main Palestinian groups to meet with him Saturday night to hammer out the terms of the new truce.

Previous cease-fires have been used primarily to replenish depleted supplies rather than to seek a genuine solution to the situation. There is no reason as yet to believe the present cease-fire will be any different.

Prime Minister Karami has called a meeting of the national dialogue committee for today. The committee, which is charged with seeking a political solution to end the fighting, has made little progress thus far and has not held a session for almost two weeks. Because of the sharp deterioration in relations between Karami, a Muslim, and key Christian leaders—President Franjiyah, Interior Minister Shamun, and Phalanges chief Jumayyil—the committee seems unlikely to make much headway.

Karami angered both the Phalangists and Shamun's National Liberal Party last Friday by taking charge of security affairs, previously in Shamun's hands. Karami also accused the forces controlled by Shamun and the Phalangists of instigating the most recent flare-up in fighting in the capital. Fears that Karami himself will resign, however, have abated. He indicated publicly Sunday that he intends to remain prime minister until the security situation is under control.

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[redacted] a Lebanese army officer told the US defense attache that Syrian forces had engaged Lebanese army units near Zahlah.

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It seems likely that Syria has, at a minimum, reinforced its Saiqa units inside Lebanon because of the increase in the fighting late last week. The Syrians may also have spread rumors that Syrian regulars had intervened or were about to intervene in order to put pressure on the Phalangists to accept a new cease-fire.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We continue to believe, however, that Damascus will use its forces only to posture and does not want to send its regular forces overtly into Lebanon for fear of provoking an Israeli military counterreaction.

[REDACTED]

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SPANISH SAHARA

Spain's new search for a UN solution to the Saharan problem was brought about by Algeria's strong opposition to Madrid's bargaining directly with Morocco and Mauritania on the issue and by Morocco's unwillingness to call off its planned mass march into the territory.

Prince Juan Carlos' surprise one-day visit to Spanish Sahara yesterday has now committed the new leader's prestige to support of UN efforts. Moroccan King Hassan remains equally committed to gaining recognition of Morocco's territorial claims.

Madrid presumably decided it had little alternative to going along with further efforts under UN auspices, in view of Algeria's determination to resist a bilateral deal between Spain and Morocco. Such a course would, moreover, provide international legitimization for a demonstration of resoluteness by Juan Carlos to uphold Spain's obligations toward Spanish Sahara. The prince's trip to the territory also demonstrated his solidarity with the army, whose backing he realizes is essential.

The UN Security Council resolution passed yesterday calls on Secretary General Waldheim to resume consultations with the concerned parties. It omits any reference to the UN trusteeship arrangement that Waldheim has discussed with Spain and the North African states involved. The proposal apparently called for Spanish withdrawal early next year and temporary UN administration of the territory.

It is not readily apparent what further inducements Waldheim can offer the parties to the dispute to head off a confrontation between Morocco, Spain, and Algeria.

Hassan, however, may fear that any referendum would reveal overwhelming Saharan sentiment for independence.

Spain's acceptance of a UN role leaves Hassan little choice but to proceed with the march. He has invested too much personal prestige to back down empty-handed and is likely to begin the march within a few days. Hassan's failure to achieve some satisfaction on Spanish Sahara would seriously undermine his ability to stay in power.

Morocco will probably claim that Madrid's determination to stop the march by force if necessary, rather than Morocco's own actions, is contrary to yesterday's

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Security Council resolution. Once marchers cross the border, however, there will almost certainly be clashes with Spanish forces or armed partisans of the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group supported by Algeria. Moroccan troops deployed in the south are likely to intervene in that event.

Morocco has "categorically denied" press reports that its forces crossed the border into Spanish Sahara yesterday and clashed with the Polisario Front. The Moroccan information minister said, however, that he could not exclude the possibility that pro-Moroccan residents of the territory might have "raised the Moroccan flag" in some areas. It is possible that Moroccan irregulars posing as Saharans crossed the border to establish a symbolic presence and clashed with a Polisario force.

Algeria will support the Security Council's call for restraint. It wants to return the Saharan problem to the General Assembly, which in the past has strongly backed self-determination. The new Security Council resolution in fact pointedly refers to the General Assembly's role in the Saharan question.

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SPAIN

The Spanish Communist Party has apparently made significant concessions in its bid to create a facade of unity between the two loose coalitions of the left.

The joint communique issued Saturday by the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta and the more moderately leftist Democratic Platform of Convergence would not condemn Prince Juan Carlos without a trial. The communique was carefully vague on the crucial point of Communist demands for the establishment of a provisional government and the calling of a national referendum to choose between monarchy and republic. The statement issued this weekend called for a "democratic break" with Francoism and referred generally to a "constituent period" which would lead to a referendum. No deadline was set for the referendum.

The other three main "objectives" listed in the communique were: amnesty for political prisoners; freedom for labor unions and political parties and guarantees of human rights; and full political rights and freedoms for regions such as Catalonia and the Basque country. These are all issues on which there is broad agreement in the Spanish opposition. Significantly, the communique closed with the statement that the two coalitions, while remaining in contact and cooperating from time to time, will continue to search for their own particular objectives.

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PORTUGAL

Leftist forces in Portugal are citing the arrest last weekend of two supporters of former president Spinoia to justify their claims that a right-wing coup is imminent.

The two former military officers, who reportedly left the country with Spinoia following the abortive coup of March 11, were picked up by security troops at a camp for Angolan refugees in northern Portugal. They were said to have entered Portugal secretly from Spain. The US embassy in Lisbon reports that several individuals with ties to the conservative Portuguese Liberation Army may also have been detained.

Anti-Communist military leaders, including Prime Minister Azevedo, are appealing for calm and unity to cool the unrest stirred by anticipation of Angolan independence next week. An army spokesman yesterday denied leftist-inspired reports that live-fire maneuvers are scheduled for this week. He labeled the story "alarmist" and said such drills could only lead to a coup attempt from the right.

General Charais, commander of the central military region, warned the left in an interview last week that any attempt on its part to overthrow the Azevedo government and turn Angola over to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola would spawn a right-wing power play. Charais believes that the left has alienated a substantial portion of the population, creating the conditions for a successful resurgence by the right.

The left has been agitating to abandon Lisbon's declared policy of impartiality among the three Angola liberation movements and to support the Popular Movement, but the Azevedo government does not appear likely to change its neutral posture and further antagonize either the left or the right. In addition to internal pressures from left-wing political parties, the press organs they control, and sympathetic radical military officers, Popular Movement activists are arriving in Lisbon on refugee flights to take part in rallies supporting the Popular Movement. The first is scheduled for tonight.

As the airlift of refugees from Angola comes to an end, conservative refugee groups are certain to become bolder in registering their discontent with left-wing support for the Popular Movement as well as insufficient resettlement assistance from the Lisbon government. The bombing and sacking late last month of an Angolan cultural center controlled by the Popular Movement suggests that the returnees do not intend to shy away from violence. To counter the left-wing efforts, they have planned a demonstration against the Popular Movement for later in the week.

Despite the political turmoil, the 19-man Revolutionary Council is attempting to

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carry out business as usual. The Council did not, as rumored, take action against army chief Fabiao or security head Carvalho at its session last weekend. It did, however, approve the long-awaited legal framework for the investigation and trial of nearly 1,300 members of the former regime's security police, who have been detained without charges since the April 1974 coup. The Council also set up a tribunal to deal with persons implicated in the March 11 coup attempt and announced its intention to arrest civilians possessing military arms.

The anti-Communist members of the Council may have decided to delay plans against Fabiao and Carvalho because of the concerted campaign by left-wing military and civilian groups to equate their removal with rightist plots to take over the government.

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Another likely obstacle to the anti-Communists is President Costa Gomes, who has served as the major stumbling block in previous attempts to oust radical officers from high positions.

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ROMANIA

Romanian President Ceausescu clearly used his four-day official visit to Lisbon to show Bucharest's determination to pursue its own interpretation of Communist doctrine.

Ceausescu pressed for closer Romanian-Portuguese ties both to increase his international prestige and to try to head off a radical swing to the left that could bring Portugal under considerable Soviet influence.

Little of what Ceausescu said in Lisbon will sit well with the Kremlin. His comments to his Portuguese hosts, particularly regarding the cooperation of all political parties—Communist, socialist, and even “those sections of the bourgeoisie that wish to serve the homeland”—are doctrinal heresy of the first order. Moreover, they clash directly with the recent Zorodov article in *Pravda* condemning those Communist leaders who dilute revolutionary zeal by cooperating with non-Communists. Ceausescu also reaffirmed Romania's strong devotion to the principles of independence and opposition to every form of interference in the internal affairs of others.

Additionally, in his toast to Prime Minister Azevedo, Ceausescu praised the Romanian-Portuguese Friendship Treaty of last June, the first between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and drew a parallel between Lisbon's problems and those that once confronted Bucharest. Romania, he said, solved these difficulties solely in conformity with its own conditions.

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Ceausescu's visit and the array of powerful leaders traveling with him suggest that he faces no serious problems at home, as some rumors have claimed. Members of the delegation include Stefan Andrei, party secretary for foreign relations; Foreign Minister Macovescu; Nicolai Dorcaru, presidential adviser on security affairs; Deputy Premier Draganescu; and army chief of staff Colonel General Ion Coman.

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SYRIA-ISRAEL

Syrian military forces apparently have reduced, at least slightly, the high level of alert they assumed more than a week ago. [REDACTED]

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The Syrians do not appear to be preparing for imminent hostilities, according to the US defense attache in Damascus, even though their forces remain in an increased state of readiness. During a tour of the Damascus area last Thursday, the attache observed more troops than usual departing on pass. Among the troops observed were personnel from the four Syrian divisions stationed along the Golan Heights and members of the Saudi contingent at Al Kiswah, some 12 miles south of Damascus. The attache also noticed that vehicle workshops at Al Kiswah had closed for the weekend, despite the large amount of equipment awaiting repair.

Meanwhile, Syria and Saudi Arabia have continued preparing for their joint air and ground exercise, already twice postponed. The US defense attache in Jidda reports that current Syrian plans call for a practice exercise to be held Wednesday or Thursday, with the actual exercise to be held the day following the practice. Part of the exercise will include an airdrop of about 120 paratroops near Dumayr, some 30 miles northeast of Damascus. This operation will be supported by Saudi F-5 fighters operating from an airfield in northern Jordan. According to the US defense attache in Amman, 12 Saudi F-5s are scheduled to arrive in Jordan today and depart next Monday. The Jordanians reportedly will not participate in the exercise but will provide airfield support and radar assistance to the Saudis. [REDACTED]

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
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CHINA-INDIA

New Delhi has protested the Chinese ambush of an Indian patrol on October 20. Peking has so far remained silent on the matter. There are no indications that either side is moving to reinforce the border.

The incident, involving a six-man Indian army patrol and 40-50 Chinese troops, took place in Arunachal Pradesh, according to the Foreign Ministry, but an Indian



army officer told the US consulate in Calcutta that the clash was inside Sikkim.

Details of the incident are sketchy. The Indian army's Eastern Region commander told a foreign diplomat on November 1 that the four Indian soldiers killed on the 20th had been tortured.

Although the exact location of the incident has not been revealed, New Delhi has taken great pains to emphasize that the attack took place in an area on the border long under its control. The common border—in dispute since the 1950s—has been the site of infrequent clashes between Chinese and Indian troops since the border war in 1962.

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JAPAN

Faced with a sluggish rate of economic recovery and public apathy toward defense, Japan Defense Agency Director General Sakata has suggested a revised approach in the formulation of the Fourth Defense Plan program, scheduled to begin in March 1976.

Sakata believes that the planning effort must be geared to Japan's new international environment—a view that places priority on political considerations and looks toward the next ten years as a “time of peace” for Japan. He hopes to strengthen cooperation with the US and has proposed significant reductions in ground force personnel.

According to Sakata, future defense planning would emphasize the concept of “Limits on Defense Power in Peacetime” first introduced in 1973. This calls for the development of forces necessary to deter or repel sudden, small-scale attacks. Additionally, the Self-Defense Forces' role in natural disaster relief operations would be significantly increased.

Defense Agency officials acknowledge that maintenance of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty is essential as a deterrent to large-scale nuclear attack: since there is little likelihood of a massive conventional attack, the ability to repel small-scale surprise attacks is a proper goal for the Self-Defense Forces.

Economic considerations undoubtedly played a major part in Sakata's proposal. As a result, defense-related expenses are to be held to previous levels—no more than 1 percent of GNP. Sakata particularly wants to bolster weaknesses in antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and logistic support by cutting ground force personnel by one third (36,000 personnel). The proposal to assume disaster relief responsibilities would further strain ground force capabilities.

The public's general indifference to defense matters, combined with the often open hostility of the political left, has been a major stumbling block to any significant expansion of the defense forces. Sakata has been well aware of the problem and has had some success in his attempts to promote a national public dialogue concerning defense questions.

Sakata wants to achieve a consensus among Defense Agency uniformed and civilian officials, but his proposals for peacetime limits and ground force reductions are likely to encounter resistance from the uniformed services, which still favor defense planning on the basis of potential regional military threats. The chief of the ground staff, General Miyoshi, reportedly is so vigorously opposed to the reduction that he may be forced to resign if Sakata's proposals are accepted.

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RHODESIA

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's meeting with Joshua Nkomo is the first open contact between Smith and a black nationalist leader since the abortive Victoria Falls conference last August.

Smith's overture to Nkomo may well harden the recent schism in the African National Council. Nkomo was elected president of the council by a congress held in Salisbury in late September. The congress convened despite the opposition of Bishop Muzorewa, who was confirmed in December as head of the council—an amalgam of several nationalist groups that agreed to a truce with Smith. Muzorewa's followers boycotted the session that elected Nkomo council president.

Although Muzorewa has advocated a negotiated settlement, his break with Nkomo made the bishop dependent on exiled insurgents who want to resume full-scale guerrilla warfare. Nkomo, on the other hand, is a former insurgent who turned against militancy because his group is relatively weak militarily.

Smith may hope that opening talks with Nkomo will head off a new guerrilla offensive,

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[REDACTED] like the other three African presidents who have been trying to mediate a Rhodesian settlement, Machel will find it difficult to back the non-militant nationalists unless Nkomo shows that he has broader support than Muzorewa among all active Rhodesian nationalists. A week ago, Muzorewa's adherents staged a rally in Salisbury that produced a much larger crowd than the gathering that followed Nkomo's election to the presidency of the council.

It is unlikely that Muzorewa or any of the exiled insurgents has a larger personal following than Nkomo's. Rather, the larger turn-out for the Muzorewa rally may reflect tribal opposition to Nkomo's faction, which has drawn most of its members from a minority tribal grouping.

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Nevertheless, if Nkomo is to neutralize such apparent support for leaders who are calling for a liberation war, he must extract much more favorable terms from Smith than the latter yet appears ready to concede.


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